Expertise
The Central Asian Gas Ring: from «fast reverse» to long-term energy security for the region
Askar Ismailov, Central Asia Adviser, The Global Gas Centre (Geneva), for Petroleum
Central Asia is entering a new cycle of energy risks, where the “gas question” is no longer a narrow sectoral issue but a condition for state resilience. The reason is simple: natural gas in the region is both an industrial feedstock and the backbone of the power system.
Askar Ismailov, Advisor for Central Asia at The Global Gas Centre (Geneva, Switzerland).
He has over 25 years of experience in the oil and gas industry.
He contributed to the development of the major projects in Kazakhstan - Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan.
His international experience includes the Shah Deniz project (Azerbaijan), the Southern Gas Corridor (Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey), and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.
In Uzbekistan, gas currently accounts for more than 70% of electricity generation, so any drop in gas supply almost automatically becomes a problem for electricity and heat production. In Kazakhstan, gas is also critical, though the structure is different: gas-fired plants provide about 30% of power generation, and the rest is mainly covered by coal, which creates separate constraints on environmental performance and operational flexibility.
For countries reliant on hydropower, gas is no less important as a reserve and an insurance against hydrological shortfalls. Seasonal and climatic variability in the region is increasingly imposing direct limits on generation, underscoring the need for thermal generation and energy imports. The logic of the energy balance pushes Central Asia to view gas infrastructure as part of a common reliability system rather than a set of disconnected pipelines within each country. This is the framework set by the Central Asia Gas Ring project as an instrument of regional energy security and mutual backstopping.
Why “fast reverse” from Russia already has a ceiling
Amid shortages and winter peaks in 2022-2024, the region received a "quick" solution: importing Russian gas to Uzbekistan via reverse flow through the Central Asia-Center trunk pipeline system (CAC). In June 2023, Uzbekistan officially reported a contract to import 2.8 bln m³ per year. This scheme does help cover short-term gaps and get through winter peaks. But it is structured as a short-distance fix in both technical and economic terms.
Let us look at the system's engineering orientation. Central Asia-Center was designed as a south-to-north export corridor (from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia) and was built from 1967 to 1985. The architecture of compressor stations, tie-ins, metering units, the logic of pressure control, and operating modes were all historically optimized for the nominal direction. Reverse flow is possible, but it is rarely symmetrical in capacity and flexibility. Even in European practice, enabling reverse flows often requires not cosmetic but capital works: changing the configuration of crossovers, valves, pressure-reduction units, metering, and substantial retuning of the control system.
Do not forget compression and bottlenecks. Compressor stations are not just engines on a pipe. Their operating modes, including suction and discharge configuration, valving, bypass lines, and constraints on vibration and surge, are often calculated for specific directions and pressure ranges. Converting to stable reverse at large volumes usually means either replacing or upgrading equipment or building new compression capacity and crossovers. Otherwise, throughput falls, and the risks of incidents and unplanned shutdowns rise.
Safety and pipeline integrity under regime changes also matter. Regulators and industry bodies explicitly note that flow reversal and the associated hydraulic shifts require a review of assumptions on integrity, corrosion risks, leak-detection performance, and operating procedures.
In international practice, reversals and regime changes are treated as a factor that can lead to incidents if engineering preparation and control are insufficient. In Central Asia, this is compounded by the age of infrastructure, which automatically leads to physical wear and degraded throughput. Up to 70% of Kazakhstan's gas pipelines are worn and require modernization, and CAC capacity has halved from the design 90 billion m³/year to 45 bln m³/year.
These estimates are directionally consistent with external sources: industry surveys and documents likewise report high wear on trunk infrastructure (up to 70%) and the need for large-scale modernization. For CAC, specialized materials cite a current effective capacity range of about 45-55 bln m³/year.
The main conclusion: to make reverse flow not an emergency option but a stable multi-year supply base at rising volumes, the one-way corridor must, in effect, be turned into a fully modernized bidirectional system. That is the same path of capital investment that the Central Asia Gas Ring concept proposes to package systematically.
Ten-Year Outlook
Demand in the region is rising structurally. According to UNECE estimates, Uzbekistan’s domestic gas demand is expected to reach 65 bln m³ by 2030, implying a growth of about 30%. In parallel, at the official level, Uzbekistan is discussing higher imports. In 2024, the minister of energy cited a target of 10–11 bln m³ of imports per year by 2030. That is several times larger than the initial starter setup of 2.8 bln m³ per year.
Supply within the region is also under pressure. A significant share of produced associated gas is reinjected, which reduces the availability of sales gas. Industry data confirm the scale: in Kazakhstan, reinjection in 2023 was 22 bln m³. Presentation estimates of the production structure also indicate that on the order of 30 bln m³ can go to oil and gas sector needs (including reinjection and own use) with total production around 55 bln m³. This explains why the sales gas balance becomes the bottleneck even with high gross output.
As for external supply, that is Russian gas, this option looks less guaranteed over a ten-year horizon, not because of one event but because of competition among destinations and contractual priorities. Current volumes from the Russian Federation are a temporary solution, and over time, Russian flows to China will be a higher priority than to Central Asia. Even without contentious forecasts of how much gas will remain, the basic logic is simple: as Central Asian demand grows and Russia simultaneously orients toward Asian markets, dependence on reverse flow via the Central Asia-Center system turns into a strategic risk rather than an insurance policy.
From an engineering perspective, a 10-year horizon raises the question of whether an old system can be operated indefinitely in a nonstandard mode without effectively becoming a new system. Even point projects show the money and work involved. For example, modernization of one segment in public estimates was at $742 mln, and expansion of the Bozoy underground gas storage to 4 bln m³ by 2028 was also discussed. These are only pieces of the puzzle. Once import and cross-border flows multiply, the temporary scheme inevitably hits the need for a comprehensive rebuild.
What the “Central Asia Gas Ring” is, and why it is not “just another pipeline”
The idea of a "gas ring" is to link the gas transmission systems of the five republics into a loop that allows flows to be reallocated, force-majeure gaps to be bridged, and scenarios in which one republic falters, and the others stand by to be avoided. An important detail: this is not only about Kazakhstan or "import/export." It is an infrastructure logic of mutual backstop for heat and electricity.
This is why external analytical platforms are already paying attention to the project. In the short term, the ring can become a key element of energy security, increasing supply stability, investment appeal, and interconnection among the countries. For Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, it offers additional export opportunities; for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, it provides supply reliability and integration into a wider network.
There is a specific meaning for the power sector. It is fuel resilience. Where gas is the base fuel for generation, as in Uzbekistan, the gas transmission system literally becomes part of “power reliability.” Where hydropower’s share is high, the ring lets shortfalls in water be covered faster and more predictably with fuel for thermal power plants and boiler houses, reducing the risk of seasonal deficits.
Money and realism: checking order of magnitude
The length of the main loop is on the order of 3,000 to 3,500 km, and the indicative CAPEX is $4 to $5 bln, with 30–40% for new construction and 60–70% for modernization of existing trunklines, compressor stations, and control systems.
Because this is still an "order of magnitude," not a feasibility study (FS), it is correct to test not "cent-level accuracy" but the adequacy of the range. For a benchmark, one can look at international gas pipeline projects of comparable scale. For example, according to the World Bank (ICR), the total cost of TANAP was cited at $5.412 bln for a length of 1,811 km. That gives an order of about $3 mln/km in a real project. Since a significant share of the "ring" is modernization of existing lines and compression, the proposed $4–5 bln range does not look overstated and is instead a realistic frame for discussion before the FS stage.
More important is this. If the ring is not built, comparable money will still be spent, but reactively on emergency expansions, local bypasses, forced repairs, and "fire-drill" purchases of fuel and/or electricity in peak periods. That is the economic nature of strategic infrastructure: it is cheaper than the cost of systemic failures.
Preliminary financing talks for this project have already begun with one investment bank in Switzerland.
The project’s strategic value in sector logic lies in a threefold effect. First, the ring creates route optionality and operational flexibility within the region, reducing the risk that a single node or country becomes the "only door" for fuel during peak demand. Second, it forms a shared reliability envelope for the power sector, which is especially critical for systems with a high share of gas in generation. Third, it shifts the region from "each solves problems alone" to a coordinated market with clear rules for capacity reservation, seasonal balancing, and co-financing of investments.
Clearly stated: the project is intended to deliver energy independence and mutual benefit to the five republics, prevent a repeat of any "gas collapse," and ensure heat and light for citizens.
Put in one sentence, the Central Asia Gas Ring is a way to replace today’s dependence on a temporary reverse flow through infrastructure designed for the opposite direction with a regional system originally engineered for bidirectional flows, growing demand, and the role of gas as a fuel for power generation. That is not a “pipe project” but a project of regional resilience.