Politics
Kazakhstan After the Reset: What System of Power President Tokayev Is Building
Since the spring of 2026, Kazakhstan has effectively entered a new political cycle. In the space of a few months, the country has adopted a new Constitution, abandoned its bicameral parliament, elected the first convocation of the Kurultai, restored the institution of the vice-president (which existed in the first years of Independence), and carried out a large-scale reconfiguration of the state apparatus.
Formally, this is a matter of changing political institutions and personalities. Yet if the events are viewed as a whole, something else becomes apparent: the president is forming a new configuration of power in which he keeps for himself the central role of arbiter while distributing political, administrative, economic, and security responsibility among several centres.
For investors, this restructuring is of interest not in itself. Oil and gas, energy, infrastructure, and industrial projects are delivered over horizons of ten, twenty years, and more, and so what matters to them is not the name of a state institution but the ability of the system to keep decisions once taken inviolable through changes of cabinets, officials, and political cycles. It is precisely from this point of view that the current changes appear most substantive.
The Constitution: A New Structure in Place of the Old System
On March 15, a new Constitution of Kazakhstan was adopted at a national referendum. According to official figures from the Central Election Commission, 87.15% of those taking part voted for it, on a turnout of 73.12%. Figures of that kind, admittedly, cause no particular surprise in the post-Soviet space. The new Basic Law came into force on July 1, and the 1995 Constitution ceased to have effect on the same day.
On scale, this is not another series of amendments to the Basic Law but a new constitutional framework. Formally, the reform continues the course of political modernisation begun after the events of January 2022; however, its result has not been the transformation of the presidential model into a parliamentary one but the creation of a different version of the presidential system.
The most conspicuous change is the abolition of the bicameral parliament. The Senate and the Mazhilis ceased their powers on July 1, and the legislative body became the unicameral Kurultai of 145 deputies, elected for 5 years under a proportional system in a single nationwide constituency. Simplifying the parliamentary structure can speed up the legislative process. At the same time, the additional institutional filter that the Senate provided has disappeared.
The Kurultai has the right to give its consent to the appointment of the prime minister and the vice-president, and to participate in appointing judges of the Constitutional Court, members of the Central Election Commission, and members of the Supreme Audit Chamber. The government is formally accountable to both the president and parliament. Experience shows, however, that the real powers of any parliament are determined not only by the text of the Constitution. They depend on how far deputies are prepared to take advantage of the opportunities granted to them and on whether they are capable of forming an independent political position.
The First Kurultai: A New Form, a Familiar Balance
The elections of August 23 showed that the new parliamentary model does not yet create an independent centre of political competition. Of the 145 mandates, the pro-presidential Adilet party took 110. Four more cleared the five per cent threshold: Auyl with 10 mandates, Respublica with 9, Ak Zhol with 8, and the Nationwide Social Democratic Party with 8. In the first Kurultai, therefore, a single party controls around three-quarters of the mandates. The remaining political forces are represented by factions that are not in opposition to the president.
For the functioning of the state, this means a high degree of predictability. The likelihood of a serious legislative confrontation between the president, the government, and parliament is low, which means new rules and decisions can pass through the legislative system more quickly. For an investor, this is a potential plus, particularly for large infrastructure projects that require many regulatory decisions to be made in sequence.
The reverse side of such a structure is that there are as yet no grounds for regarding the Kurultai as an independent centre of political decision-making. Kazakhstan has not received a parliamentary system in place of a presidential one, but rather a more compact parliament within the presidential system. That is precisely why the real content of the reform will be determined not by the Kurultai's mere appearance but by how it uses its new powers. If parliament gradually gains the ability to correct the executive's decisions, the constitutional reform will take on deeper political content. If its main function remains the legislative formalisation of decisions taken within the executive circuit, the sole result of the reform will be an increase in manageability and in the speed of decision-making.
Karin and the Question of Succession
The most politically significant personnel decision of recent months has been the appointment of Yerlan Karin as vice-president. For many years, Karin has been directly at the centre of shaping Tokayev's political course: he worked as assistant to the president, as State Secretary, as State Counsellor, and, from June 30, 2026, as first deputy head of the Presidential Administration. He has now received a post to which the new Constitution attaches a special status.
In the event of the early termination of the president's powers, the vice-president assumes the powers of the head of state. If he is unable to do so, the powers pass to the chairman of the Kurultai and, should that scenario also prove impossible, to the prime minister. In this way, the mechanism of succession, which previously remained largely a political rather than an institutional problem, has acquired a clearly defined procedure.
It would be premature to call Karin the designated successor to Tokayev. The president has not publicly announced any such decision, and the post of vice-president has a perfectly self-contained functional meaning of its own. It is intended to serve as the connecting link among the president, the Kurultai, and the government.
But the political sense of the appointment is nevertheless considerably wider. Particular weight is lent to it by the July ruling of the Constitutional Court. The court explained that Tokayev's presidential term, which began under the 1995 Constitution, does not count towards the limit set by the new Basic Law. Legally, therefore, the president has gained the possibility of standing after 2029 for a new seven-year term. Tokayev himself has not so far stated any intention of doing so.
As a result, the present system leaves two possibilities open at once. The president may continue his own political leadership, or he may use the structure that has gradually been created to prepare for a succession. The very fact that a vice-president has appeared means that the state now has an institutional mechanism for both options.
Bektenov and the Principle of Managerial Continuity
Against this background, the reappointment of Olzhas Bektenov as prime minister is no less significant, although it looks far less intriguing politically. Bektenov has headed the government since February 2024. During that time, his cabinet has been directly involved in delivering numerous infrastructure and investment projects. Presenting his candidacy, Tokayev spoke separately of Kazakhstan as "one big construction site."
After such a large-scale constitutional restructuring, the president could have used the change in the political system as a pretext to replace the government entirely. He did not do so. Most of the key ministers and deputy prime ministers have also kept their positions, and the cabinet reshuffles are targeted.
For investors, this is, perhaps, a more important signal than it may appear. The state is demonstrating that changing the political architecture does not automatically entail the cancellation or revision of economic policy. The government's task is not to construct a new political system but to fill it with concrete content: infrastructure, industrial projects, energy, investment attraction, and regional development.
A simple rule applies in this context: you do not change horses in midstream. Energy is a characteristic example. After the government's resignation, occasioned by the convening of the new Kurultai, Yerlan Akkenzhenov was reappointed minister of energy by presidential decree. Since March 2025, when he took charge of the ministry, he has been directly involved in several long-term projects of significant importance to the industry. Among them are the arbitration proceedings with the shareholders in the Kashagan project, preparations for developing the Western part of Kashagan, and the advancement of construction of the fourth refinery.
For each of these areas, a change in the minister in charge at the time of the transition from one political system to another would have added an additional source of uncertainty. Akkenzhenov's reappointment can therefore be regarded as a continuation of the same personnel logic as Bektenov's retention: projects at the stages of negotiation, approval, and preparation for delivery should not depend on every successive restructuring of the state apparatus.